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“[H]uman displacement has become a far more complex issue. . . . We
must not lose sight of the individual people who are fleeing
persecution.”1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Public morality and sexual norms have no place in asylum law; yet,
the influence of both in the fates of sexually controversial asylum ap-
plicants is undeniably present.  For instance, a young victim of an at-
tempted kidnapping for sex trafficking will be sent back to risk cycling
through vicious prostitution rings.2  The stakes are just as high for
transgender immigrants, as no published immigration decision recog-
nizes transgender identity in the asylum context.3  At the same time,
despite inconsistent applications of the law, asylum claims for gay
men and lesbian women based on sexual orientation have only re-
cently become commonplace.4
When it comes to the fates of refugee applicants, the influence of
public morality cannot be contained in a manner that would allow fair
and consistent outcomes for each person.  Although the consideration
of societal norms is important in the admission of immigrants, the ad-
judication of asylum applications requires a special degree of interna-
tional perspective and cultural fluency.5  The consideration of these
norms, particularly those surrounding sex, can inhibit, and even en-
danger, the lives of numerous applicants seeking asylum under the
protected ground of “membership in a particular social group.”6  This
includes sexual minorities and victims of forced prostitution.7  A deci-
sion maker’s perceptions of what is moral should not justify the aban-
donment of desperate individuals truly in need of refuge.  To accept
the influence of public morality and sexual norms in asylum law is to
subject desperate individuals to a ruthless game of “refugee roulette,”8
2. See, e.g., Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2005).
3. Immigration Law and the Transgender Client, IMMIGR. EQUALITY, http://immigra
tionequality.org/issues/law-library/trans-manual/asylum/#5-5-asylum%E2%80%
94sources-of-law (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).
4. See, e.g., Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2005); Molathwa v. Ash-
croft, 390 F.3d 551 (8th Cir. 2004); Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719 (3d Cir.
2003).
5. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §§ 212(a) and 237(a), crimes
involving moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, and certain political affiliations
may constitute grounds for inadmissibility or deportability.  8 U.S.C. § 1182
(1952); 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (1996).  However, an alien in such proceedings may make
a separate claim for asylum as a form of relief from removal, irrespective of his or
her deportability status under the Act.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2006).
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).
7. Throughout this Article, the terms “LGBTQ” and “sexual minorities” will refer to
the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (including intersex) members
of society.  For more information on the definitions encompassed in the “LGBTQ”
acronym, see Definition of Terms, GENDER EQUITY RESOURCE CENTER AT U. OF
CAL.–BERKELEY, http://geneq.berkeley.edu/lgbt_resources_definiton_of_terms
(last visited Nov. 26, 2012).
8. This “refugee roulette” analogy refers to the infamous practice of Russian rou-
lette—a potentially lethal game of chance where a player loads a single bullet
into the chamber of a revolver, spins the cylinder, and pulls the trigger while
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where many applicants receive the metaphorical bullet when a court
pulls the trigger and issues its decision.9
In order to understand the influence of public morality in asylum
law, it is important to understand what public morality is.  There is no
set definition of public morality; however, it is undisputed that it con-
cerns the regulation of the moral conduct or character of individual
persons through the law.10  Public morality attempts to justify the en-
forcement of a particular society’s ethical and moral standards of right
and wrong.  As a result, the concept of what is moral may vary from
state to state or region to region.11  In the United States, public moral-
ity often manifests itself in the government regulation of sex, includ-
ing adultery, homosexuality, and prostitution.12
At first blush, having judicial decisions reflect popular societal
norms appears to be a good idea.  Society would maintain its distinct
culture, and a majority of the population would be satisfied with the
result.  However, when a judge begins to adhere to popular norms, we
are no longer a country of law, but instead a country of arbitrary rul-
ings based on no standard at all.  Without objective law, there can be
no voice for the minority, no positive change, and no progression of
society.
This Note highlights how public morality hides under the guise of
judicial discretion in asylum decisions involving interpretations of
“membership in a particular social group.”  Part I discusses the United
States’ current asylum obligations under both international and do-
mestic law.  Part II highlights the current influence of morality in two
types of controversial sex-based claims:13 those based on identification
as a sexual minority and those involving victims of forced prostitution
pointing the gun at someone or one’s own head. Definition of Russian Roulette,
OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_eng
lish/Russian%2Broulette (last visited Apr. 27, 2013).
9. This analogy plays upon the idea that an asylum applicant may never know just
how the public morals of society and the decision maker will affect the outcome of
the decision, and ultimately, his or her life.  If a refugee receives the “bullet” and
is denied relief, he or she will be sent back to a life of dangerous persecution and,
potentially, death.  When public morality and sexual norms, irrelevant in the
grant of asylum, creep into the decision-making process, the U.S. asylum process
becomes nothing more than a game of chance, where the result depends on the
location of the court and the presiding judge.
10. Christopher Wolfe, Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM. J.
JURIS. 65, 65 (2000).
11. See id.
12. Id. at 66.
13. For purposes of this Note, sex-based claims do not necessarily refer to gender-
based claims.  Unless otherwise stated, the term “sex” will reference human sexu-
ality and sex practices only.  The term “gender” will reference the state or identi-
fication of being male, female, or gender-neutral.
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and sex trafficking.14  Part III analyzes how morality has found its
way into the asylum courtroom.  Specifically, common misconceptions
surrounding sex and inconsistent interpretations of statutory lan-
guage have allowed judges and agency decision makers to exercise
great discretion in evaluating asylum claims, often leading to unjust
and arbitrary results.  Finally, Part IV proposes solutions to the issues
raised by the influence of public morality and sexual norms in asylum
law, including amendments to domestic refugee statutes and interna-
tional instruments.
II. STATE ASYLUM OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
AND DOMESTIC LAW
Immediately following the tragedies of World War II, the United
Nations (U.N.) faced an increased demand to focus on the numerous
war victims and displaced persons seeking international refuge.15
Specifically, the devastated and overwhelmed countries of Europe
called for a revision of previous international agreements regarding
refugee and asylum matters, as well as a standard international defi-
nition of “refugee.”16  In 1951, the U.N. responded to these demands
by adopting the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.17
Under this Convention, the U.N. defined a refugee as any person who
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is
outside of the country of his [or her] nationality and is unable, or owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that
country.18
14. “Forced prostitution” or “sex trafficking” is when a commercial sex act is induced
by force, fraud, or coercion.  The coercion may come from a variety of sources,
including economic factors, duress, kidnapping, drug addiction, and domestic vio-
lence.  Because of this, sex trafficking and prostitution are seen as inextricably
linked in the United States.  Heather J. Clawson, Nicole Dutch, Amy Solomon &
Lisa Goldblatt Grace, Human Trafficking Into and Within the United States: A
Review of the Literature, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 1 (Aug. 2009),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/humantrafficking/litrev/index.pdf. See also Susan A.
Cohen, Ominous Convergence: Sex Trafficking, Prostitution, and International
Family Planning, GUTTMACHER INST. 12 (Feb. 2005), http://www.guttmacher.org/
pubs/tgr/08/1/gr080112.html (explaining how prostitution and sex trafficking are
closely related).
15. Melissa J. Hernandez Pimentel, The Invisible Refugee: Examining the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ “Social Visibility” Doctrine, 76 MO. L. REV. 575, 580 (2011).
16. See id.
17. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) & Pro-
tocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967), UNITED NATIONS AUDIO VISUAL
LIBR. OF INT’L L. 1, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/prsr/prsr_e.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 3, 2013).
18. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
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The 1951 Convention also adopts the obligation of nonrefoulement,
which is the responsibility of a state not to return any person whose
“life or freedom would be threatened on account of his [or her] race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or polit-
ical opinion.”19
However, the original scope of the Convention was extremely lim-
ited by both time and space.20  Under Article 1(A)(2), a refugee had to
prove that his or her fear was a “result of [the] events occurring [in
Europe] before 1 January 1951.”21  Because of these restrictions, the
Convention could not properly address the needs of the international
refugee community during the first decade of its existence.  Due to the
ever-changing scheme of refugee applicants throughout the next dec-
ade, the U.N. adopted the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Ref-
ugees.22  Contrary to popular belief, the Protocol did not “add” to the
1951 Convention; rather, it operated as an independent international
instrument under which State Parties agreed to apply Articles 2
through 34 of the Convention.23  Thus, the Protocol eliminated the
spatial and temporal limitations of the refugee definition in Article 1
of the Convention.24  The United States is a signatory to the Protocol
and, pursuant to its international obligations, has adopted a nearly
identical version of the 1951 Convention.25
The United States’ domestic version of the 1951 Convention is
found in sections 101(a)(42), 208, and 241(b)(3) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 2000 (INA).  Under United States asylum
law,26 there are two procedural avenues to “refugee” relief: asylum
under INA § 208 or withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3).  Al-
though asylum and withholding of removal are closely related, each
form of relief requires different procedures and carries a different bur-
den of proof.27  Asylum grants relief to applicants and paves a path to
19. Id. at 30.
20. See id. at 14.
21. Id. at 14–15.
22. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 17, ¶¶ 32–34.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2013) (containing statutory
provisions similar to the 1951 Convention).
26. To be clear, the two forms of relief (asylum and withholding of removal) apply
only to immigrants present in the United States at the time they file their claim.
Conversely, actual “refugee” relief is given only to those who are outside of the
United States when they apply and qualify for asylum. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a)(1)–(2).
27. INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 430–31 (1987) (holding that asylum is
governed under the reasonable fear standard; a ten percent chance of being per-
secuted can be sufficient to satisfy the definition); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407,
413 (1984) (holding that withholding of deportation is governed under the clear
probability standard); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(ii), 208.16(b) (placing the
burden of proof on the applicant).
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lawful permanent residency and citizenship.28  It is, however, a form
of discretionary relief.  The United States government, via judges and
agency decision makers, may still exercise great discretion in deter-
mining whether an applicant qualifies for asylum.29  Even if an appli-
cant successfully establishes that he or she is a refugee under the
INA, the federal government still has the authority to grant or deny
asylum based on the circumstances of each case.30
Withholding of removal, on the other hand, is the United States’
version of nonrefoulement.  Unlike asylum, withholding of removal is
not discretionary.  If an applicant qualifies for withholding of removal,
INA § 241(b)(3) compels the United States government to either find a
third country within which the applicant may safely relocate or pro-
vide the necessary refuge itself.31  However, the burden of proof for
withholding of removal32 is much higher than that of asylum.33  Un-
less the applicant’s denial was based solely on the discretionary fac-
tors, an applicant who is denied asylum will rarely find relief in a
claim for withholding of removal.34
In order to successfully apply for either form of refugee relief, the
applicant bears the burden of satisfying the statutory elements of “ref-
ugee” embodied in INA § 101(a)(42).  This section defines a refugee as
a person who is “unable or unwilling to return” to his or her country
because of “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of” one of the five protected grounds enumerated in the statute:
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
28. Lawful permanent resident (LPR) status allows an alien to legally reside and
work in the United States, but such aliens are entitled to less due process than
United States citizens.  On the other hand, citizens are persons who are either
born or naturalized as fully loyal members of society.  Landon v. Plasencia, 459
U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (holding that a lawful permanent resident cannot be deprived
of full due process rights due to a brief absence); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344
U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (stating that if an alien’s brief absence is extended, he may
lose his entitlement to lawful permanent resident status); Knauff v. Shaugh-
nessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“[W]hatever the procedure authorized by Con-
gress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”); Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609–10 (1889) (holding that the power
to decide immigration issues is vested entirely with Congress and the President
and that domestic constitutional norms are not entirely applicable to the immi-
gration field).
29. Hernandez Pimentel, supra note 15, at 578.
30. Id. n.27 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security or
the Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien who has applied for
asylum.”)).
31. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16.
32. Withholding of removal is governed under the clear probability standard.  INS v.
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
33. Asylum is governed under the reasonable fear standard.  INS v. Cardoza-
Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
34. Hernandez Pimentel, supra note 15, at 578; 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(d) (2013).
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political opinion.35  A well-founded fear indicates a subjective stan-
dard of fear; however, to prove persecution, the applicant must show
that the harm is objectively reasonable by proving both the type of
harm and the likelihood of that harm.36  Additionally, the persecutor
must be the government or an individual or entity that the govern-
ment is unwilling or unable to control.37  The applicant must also file
for asylum within one year of entering the country, unless he or she
can prove “changed” or “extraordinary circumstances” to justify ex-
tending the deadline.38
Perhaps the most widely criticized area of domestic refugee law
lies in the legal interpretations of what it means to have “membership
in a particular social group.”  Because membership in a particular so-
cial group is the broadest of the five protected grounds in asylum
claims, it naturally follows that courts tend to struggle with its inter-
pretation.39  Interpretations of the provision, both by agency officials
and judges, have evolved over the past few decades, leaving asylum
adjudicators with two well-established approaches to the legal appli-
cation of membership in a particular social group: the protected char-
acteristic approach and the social visibility test.40
In 1985, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) first attempted to
harness the interpretation of particular social group in In re Acosta,
where it established the protected characteristic approach.41  In creat-
ing the protected characteristic approach, the BIA held that certain
groups are defined by “common, immutable characteristic[s]” that the
members “cannot change, or should not be required to change because
it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.”42  For
example, members of a taxi cooperative are not members of a particu-
lar social group because they could easily change jobs.43  Likewise, a
group of “noncriminal drug informants working against the Cali drug
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
36. Persecution has various definitions in immigration law, including “the infliction
of suffering or harm upon persons who differ [in one of the five protected grounds]
in a way regarded as offensive” and “a serious threat to life or freedom on account
of” one of the five protected grounds.  Tala Hartsough, Asylum for Trafficked Wo-
men: Escape Strategies Beyond the T Visa, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 104–05
(2002).
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B)–(D) (2006).
39. For purposes of this Note, the term “courts” is a catchall term for the courts in-
volved in immigration hearings, including agency courts, such as the immigra-
tion court and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the circuit courts of
appeal, and the Supreme Court of the United States.
40. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985) (adopting protected characteristic
test); A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007) (adopting social visibility test);
C-A-, 231 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006) (same).
41. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 234.
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cartel” are not socially visible because “the very nature of the con-
duct . . . is such that it is generally out of the public view.”44  This
approach remained the interpretive standard for particular social
group for more than two decades, until the BIA announced its new
social visibility test in 2006.45  This test is not precisely defined, but
unlike the protected characteristic approach, it does not address iden-
tifying protected characteristics of the particular group.46  Rather, it
focuses on whether the group members are “externally distinguisha-
ble” through “highly visible” traits that may be recognizable to natives
in their home country.47
Despite this clear change in the particular social group analysis,
the BIA has never expressly recognized its departure from its own pre-
cedent.48  This has resulted in a current split among the circuit
courts.49  The majority of the courts apply the Chevron doctrine,50 de-
44. C-A-, 231 I. & N. Dec. at 960–61.
45. Id.
46. Hernandez Pimentel, supra note 15, at 576.
47. Id.
48. The BIA and the federal courts relied solely on the protected characteristic ap-
proach from In re Acosta for more than two decades without any other considera-
tions.  Only in the mid-2000s did the courts begin to include a social visibility
factor in the analysis.  As legal scholar Fatma Marouf noted, “Prior to these deci-
sions, neither the BIA nor the federal courts mentioned ‘social visibility’ as rele-
vant to the particular social group analysis, yet the BIA did not acknowledge any
departure from precedent.”  Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “So-
cial Visibility” in Defining a “Particular Social Group” and Its Potential Impact
on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 47, 63 (2008).
49. Compare Fuentes-Hernandez v. Holder, 411 F. App’x 438, 438–39 (2d Cir. 2011)
(stating that the BIA did not err in determining plaintiffs, Salvadoran individu-
als who resisted gang recruitment, were not members of a particular social group
because the group lacked social visibility); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen.,
663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting BIA’s social visibility doctrine); Lizama v.
Holder, 629 F.3d 400, 447 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that the Seventh Circuit re-
jected the social visibility doctrine but declining to decide on the issue); Val-
ladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 125 (4th Cir. 2011) (same); Urbina-Mejia v.
Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 365–67 (6th Cir. 2010) (concluding that being a former
gang member is part of a particular social group because it is an immutable char-
acteristic and socially visible to persecutors); Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53,
60 (1st Cir. 2009) (rejecting the claim that BIA is precluded from considering
social visibility); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting
BIA’s social visibility doctrine as inconsistent and arbitrary), with Perdomo v.
Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 666–67 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming the BIA’s visibility stan-
dard); Guevara-Acosta v. Att’y Gen., 372 F. App’x 52, 53–54 (11th Cir. 2010)
(finding the BIA’s legal definition of membership in a particular group under the
social visibility approach, neither arbitrary, capricious, nor clearly contrary to
law); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 885, 862 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming the
BIA’s visibility standard); Malonga v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 546, 553 (8th Cir. 2008)
(same).
50. The Chevron doctrine is a judicially created doctrine that requires courts to defer
to agency interpretations of relevant law so long as its interpretation is permissi-
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ferring to the BIA’s interpretation of membership in a particular so-
cial group to include the new social visibility factor.51  The Third and
Seventh Circuits are the only circuits to expressly reject the social vis-
ibility doctrine as a misapplication of international guidelines and an
injustice to the refugee system.52
With multiple approaches to interpreting “member of a particular
social group,” uncertainty and misunderstandings are inevitable.
Judges and agency decision makers should be objective triers of fact,
and officials should use their discretion only after the applicant has
satisfied the definition of refugee.53  However, inconsistent interpreta-
tions blur objective areas of the law and open the door for officials to
use discretion before it is warranted.  Thus, the influence of morality
slips through the cracks of expanded discretion, allowing agencies and
courts to improperly impose their own moral code in deciding the fates
of individuals in need of refuge.
III. CURRENT APPLICATION OF ASYLUM LAW IN SEXUALLY
CONTROVERSIAL ASYLUM CLAIMS
United States jurisprudence surrounding gender-based and sexu-
ality-based asylum claims has followed a twisted and often contradic-
tory path.  American culture often suppresses human sexuality,
resulting in a severely limited understanding of nonconforming sexual
experiences.  American public schools lack comprehensive sex educa-
tion,54 and much educational discussion regarding sexuality is stifled
in favor of hetero-normative sex culture as displayed in pop culture
and media.55  These sexual “norms” influence decisions in asylum ad-
judications, particularly with applicants who are victims of sex traf-
ficking, as well as applicants who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, or queer (LGBTQ).  Despite the objective role of asylum
adjudicators, judges and agency decision makers are not ignorant of
ble.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  For
further discussion of the doctrine and its effect on the circuit split, see infra Part
IV, section B.
51. See, e.g., Fuentes-Hernandez, 411 F. App’x at 438–39 (upholding the BIA’s defini-
tion); Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 365–67 (same); Malonga, 548 F.3d at 556 (“[W]e
must give Chevron deference to the BIA’s reasonable interpretation of the phrase
‘particular social group.’”).
52. Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 599–603; Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615–16.
53. See generally INA § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C § 1158 (2006).
54. See, e.g., State Policies on Sex Education in Schools, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLA-
TURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/state-policies-on-sex-educa
tion-in-schools.aspx (last updated Apr. 26, 2013).
55. Thomas Peele, Composition Studies, Heteronormativity, and Popular Culture,
BOISE ST. U., http://www.bgsu.edu/departments/english/cconline/peele/Cultural-
Studies.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2013); see generally Alice Park, Parents’ Sex
Talk with Kids: Too Little, Too Late, TIME MAG. (Dec. 7, 2009), http://
www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1945759,00.html.
636 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:627
these norms.  Nor are they immune to their strong influence.  When
the law is inconsistent and vague, adjudicators’ biases may sway them
to inaccurately apply the relevant factors for establishing asylum
claims.  This section analyzes the highly discretionary application of
asylum law by judges and immigration authorities, as well as the in-
consistent consequences for sexually controversial asylum seekers.
A. Victims of Forced Prostitution and Sex Trafficking as
Asylum Applicants
The practice of sex trafficking is often considered abhorrent in
Western56 society.57  Prostitution, on the other hand, is viewed as a
victimless crime arising from a personal choice to earn money through
female promiscuity.58  What many Westerners fail to realize is that
sex trafficking comes in many forms.  It is not always as easily recog-
nized as the mainstream Hollywood movies and documentaries make
it out to be.59  Women can be forced into prostitution in a number of
ways, including through domestic violence, economic necessity, and
kidnapping or enslavement.60
Recognizing trafficking as a major international concern, Congress
passed the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA)
in October of 2000.61  The TVPA tackles the issue of human traffick-
ing with a three-pronged approach: protection of victims, prosecution
of traffickers, and prevention of trafficking both domestically and
abroad.62  Through the TVPA, victims of sex trafficking may obtain
two forms of immigration relief: continued presence or the T visa.63
56. The term “western” is used to refer to cultural norms and ideas originating in the
noncommunist states or Europe and North America. Definition of Western in En-
glish, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/ameri-
can_english/western (last visited Apr. 27, 2013).
57. See Clawson, Dutch, Solomon & Grace, supra note 14.
58. See id.
59. See, e.g., Movies About Slavery and Human Trafficking, ART4ABOLITION, http://
www.art4abolition.org/movies-about-slavery.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2013)
(providing a list and synopses of movies about human trafficking).
60. Catharine A. McKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
13, 25–26 (1993).
61. Hartsough, supra note 36, at 96; see also Victims of Trafficking and Violence Pro-
tection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 8 and 22 U.S.C.) (establishing new protections for trafficking
victims, including continued presence and the T visa).  It is also important to note
that since its original enactment, the TVPA has reauthorized twice to enhance
protections for abused and trafficked women and children. See Trafficking Vic-
tims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54
(2013) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 22 U.S.C.).
62. M. Margaret McKeown & Emily Ryo, The Lost Sanctuary: Examining Sex Traf-
ficking Through the Lens of United States v. Ah Sou, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 739,
765–66 (2008).
63. Id.
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Continued presence is a form of temporary protected status (TPS) that
allows immigrant victims to be present legally in the United States
during the pendency of a criminal investigation against the sex traf-
ficker.64  Continued presence may be granted for a year at a time and
is renewable.65  However, this form of TPS is extremely discretionary
and may be revoked “at any time should officials deem the victim
uncooperative.”66
The T visa, on the other hand, provides victims with work authori-
zation and legal status for up to four years.  After the third year of T
visa status, victims may apply for lawful permanent resident status.
Although the number of T visas awarded annually is capped at 5000,
eligibility for the visa is subject to strict requirements,67 and success-
ful applications rarely exceed 250 recipients per fiscal year.68
Prior to the passage of the TVPA, successful sex trafficking asylum
cases were few and far between.  Unfortunately, the Act did not
change this trend.69  Because the TVPA offered more predictable im-
migration solutions, asylum claims became backburner arguments for
many victims70  Thus, while investigations into sex trafficking may
have increased, successful claims of asylum did not.71  The reasons for
the rejection of these asylum claims rest on two main issues: (1) sex
trafficking is generally a gender-specific crime, and (2) these women
do not fit into any particular social group under the BIA’s interpreta-
tions of particular social group.
For example, being an attractive and young woman in a high-risk
country is not enough to claim asylum as a “member of a particular
social group.”72  But it is precisely these characteristics that make wo-
men the target of kidnapping, threats, and eventual enslavement in
many source countries.73  Vitore Rreshpja was a young, attractive Al-
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.; see also Attorney General’s Annual Report to Congress on U.S. Government
Activities to Combat Trafficking in Persons Fiscal Year 2006, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
43–53 (May 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/annualreports/
tr2006/agreporthumantrafficing2006.pdf (listing cases prosecuted in 2006).
67. An applicant must meet four requirements to be eligible for a T visa.  He or she
must (1) be a victim of a “severe form of trafficking;” (2) be physically present in
the United States “on account of such trafficking;” (3) have complied with “any
reasonable request for assistance in the investigation or prosecution of acts of
trafficking;” and (4) face “extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm
upon removal.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I)–(IV) (2006).
68. McKeown & Ryo, supra note 62, at 769 (“In fiscal year 2006, out of 346 trafficking
victims who applied for a T-visa, only 182 were successful.”).
69. Id. at 767.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2005).
73. A source country in the human trafficking context is a country that supplies
young men, women, and children for the commercial sex trade.  While most vic-
638 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:627
banian woman who, because of her youth and beauty, was targeted for
sex trafficking.74  Shortly before her arrival to the United States in
late 2001, she was the victim of an attempted kidnapping.  During this
attempt, she was told that she would “end up on her back in Italy, like
many other girls.”75  Fearing for her life and freedom, Vitore and her
family made arrangements for her to study in the United States.
Upon the expiration of her student visa, Vitore filed for asylum based
on her status as a young, attractive Albanian woman forced into pros-
titution work.76  Both the immigration judge and the BIA denied her
claim.77  The Sixth Circuit affirmed.78  In its opinion, the court rea-
soned that her claim was unlike recognized gender-specific claims for
female genital mutilation because “the practice of forcing young wo-
men into prostitution in Albanian is [not] nearly as pervasive as the
practice of female genital mutilation in Somalia.”79  Furthermore, the
court argued that her social group could not be defined circularly.80  In
other words, Vitore could not assert her persecution into the particu-
larity of her social group, rendering her status as a “young attractive
Albanian woman” overbroad for purposes of defining a particular so-
cial group.
In 2012, a similar trafficking case was presented before the Sev-
enth Circuit.  Johana Cece, a young Albanian woman, was harassed
and assaulted by gang leaders who wished to force her into prostitu-
tion work.81  After the police took no action to help her, she fled to the
United States and petitioned for asylum.82  The BIA held that Johana
did not belong to a particular social group because “young Albanian
women targeted for trafficking” are not socially visible and do not
share “a narrowing characteristic other than their risk of being perse-
cuted.”83  The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed the BIA’s denial of
asylum, adding that there is no evidence that “sex trafficking poses
the same particularized and inescapable threat to all young Albanian
tims are trafficked from Asia, Europe is the destination for the majority of these
commercial sex workers and trafficking victims. Human Trafficking FAQs,
UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/hu
man-trafficking/faqs.html#Which_countries_are_affected_by_human_trafficking
(last visited Apr. 27, 2013).
74. Rreshpja, 420 F.3d at 553.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 555.
77. Id. at 553.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 556.
80. Id.
81. Cece v. Holder, 668 F.3d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 2012), vacated, No. 11-1989, 2013 WL
4083282 (7th Cir. Aug. 9, 2013).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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women” as other gender-specific crimes.84  However, a year later, the
court had an unprecedented change of heart.  Upon rehearing, the
court focused on a key “characteristic” that went overlooked in the
first opinion—Johana’s status as a “young woman from a minority re-
ligion who has lived by herself . . . and thus is [ ] particularly vulnera-
ble to traffickers . . . .”85  By including this detail in her particular
social group, the court concluded that “[w]omen who fear female geni-
tal circumcision sound a lot like women who fear prostitution” and
rejected the circular argument it had previously relied on.86
In an attempt to avoid a particular social group analysis alto-
gether, other courts have denied sex trafficking victims on different
grounds, including a re-characterization of the victim’s suffering.  For
example, in 2000, the BIA denied a Congolese woman refugee status
because her husband was simply a “despicable person” rather than an
actor persecuting her based on her “membership in the particular so-
cial group of Congolese women.”87  And, in yet another case, the immi-
gration judge denied relief to a young Russian woman because her
proposed social group—“women from her country forced into prostitu-
tion by the mafia who escape sexual bondage”—failed “to pass mus-
ter . . . under the Board’s analysis” of particular social group.88
As evidenced above, sex trafficking asylum cases rarely survive
these murky and discretionary applications of the law, even after the
TVPA made the issue a clear priority.  Establishing both social visibil-
ity and particularity for these claims is an incredibly difficult task,
particularly for these victims.89  Their only socially visible quality is
their gender, which has never been particularly narrow enough to sat-
isfy the definition of particular social group.90  Even statistical evi-
dence proves a strong negative trend toward these types of asylum
cases.  A 2007 evaluation of fifty-two trafficking cases revealed that
only 35% of these claims are granted at the immigration court level.91
That number declines to 25% upon review by the BIA.92  Although
some BIA dissents and federal circuit court reviews provide promising
language in their written decisions, the strong negative trend still
84. Id.
85. Id. at *15.
86. Id. at *18–19 (internal quotation omitted).
87. Martina Pomeroy, Left Out in the Cold: Trafficking Victims, Gender, and Misin-
terpretation of the Refugee Convention’s “Nexus” Requirement, 16 MICH. J. GEN-
DER & L. 453, 482 (2010).
88. Stephen Knight, Asylum from Trafficking: A Failure of Protection, IMMIGR. BRIEF-
INGS, July 2007, at 1, 10.
89. See Marouf, supra note 48, at 98–102.
90. Knight, supra note 88, at 11.
91. Id. at 5.
92. Id.
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prevails in sex trafficking asylum claims.93  Women are consistently
denied protection and returned to a life of sexual violence and forced
prostitution.
B. Sexual Minorities as Asylum Applicants
In 1994, former Attorney General Janet Reno officially designated
as binding precedent the BIA’s 1990 decision in In re Toboso-Al-
fonso,94 which involved a gay Cuban man who was repeatedly abused
by the Cuban government.95  As a result of his victimization, Immi-
gration and Nationality Service (Legacy INS) first recognized sexual
orientation as a protected ground under particular social group.96  The
immigration judge applied the protected characteristic test in finding
that homosexuality was an immutable characteristic.97  The BIA elab-
orated on this finding by stating that, once registered by the Cuban
government as a homosexual, his status, whether imputed98 or actual,
was unlikely to change.99
However, since the early 1990s, recognition of LGBTQ asylum
claims has been inconsistent at best.  In 1996, Legacy INS formally
adopted the position that homosexuals are part of a particular social
group for asylum purposes.100  But operating under the influence of
public opinion surrounding nonconforming sexual preferences, some
immigration courts still found ways around the recognition of LGBTQ
asylum claims.  In the mid-1990s, Alla Pitcherskaia petitioned for asy-
lum and withholding of removal on the protected ground of member-
ship in a particular social group: Russian lesbians.101  Alla had
participated in various political protests in favor of the expansion of
rights for gays and lesbians.102  The militia detained her on numerous
occasions for “hooliganism” and pressured her to reveal the identities
93. See, e.g., Cece v. Holder, 668 F.3d 510, 514 (7th Cir. 2012) (Rovner, J., dissent-
ing), vacated, No. 11-1989, 2013 WL 4083282 (7th Cir. Aug. 9, 2013).
94. Att’y Gen. Order No. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994); see Asylum, IMMIGR. EQUALITY,
http://immigrationequality.org/issues/law-library/trans-manual/asylum/#5-5-asy-
lum%E2%80%94sources-of-law (click on 5.6.1 “Membership in a Particular Social
Group”) (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) [hereinafter Asylum].
95. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 821 (B.I.A. 1990).
96. Id. at 823.
97. Id. at 822.
98. Imputed sexual orientation refers to the perceived sexual orientation of the per-
son by the persecutor, regardless of the person’s actual sexual orientation. See
Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 721 (3d Cir. 2003) (recognizing imputed sexual
orientation when a heterosexual man from Ghana was persecuted as a homosex-
ual after engaging in a single homosexual act to avoid a ritual sacrifice).
99. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 822.
100. Memorandum from David A. Martin, INS General Counsel, to All Regional and
District Counsel (Apr. 4, 1996) (on file with author).
101. Pitcherskaia v. INS., 118 F.3d 641, 643 (9th Cir. 1997).
102. Id. at 644.
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of her gay and lesbian friends.103  Because of her suspected status as a
lesbian, Alla was eventually forced into clinical psychiatric treat-
ment.104  Both the immigration judge and the BIA denied her asylum
application based on the lack of persecution in her case.105  On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reprimanded the BIA’s unsound
reasoning in stating:
The fact that a persecutor believes the harm he is inflicting is ‘good for’ his
victim does not make it any less painful to the victim . . . Human rights laws
cannot be sidestepped by simply couching actions that torture mentally or
physically in benevolent terms such as ‘curing’ or ‘treating’ the victims.106
In 2005, the Ninth Circuit recognized that both homosexual status
and homosexual acts fall within membership of a particular social
group.107  In Karouni v. Gonzales, an HIV-positive Lebanese man pe-
titioned for asylum after witnessing the murder of his friends and be-
ing outed108 to the government as a gay man.109  The court criticized
the Attorney General’s attempt to saddle the applicant with a Hob-
son’s choice110 to either “face persecution” for being gay or live “a life
of celibacy.”111  Furthermore, the court cemented the immutability of
same-sex attraction, both in status and in act:
As the Supreme Court has counseled, “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression
in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element
in a personal bond that is more enduring.” This is but one reason why “the
sexual identities [of homosexuals] are so fundamental to their human identi-
ties that they should not be required to change them.”112
Two years later, the Eighth Circuit evaluated a Ugandan lesbian’s
asylum claim based on the claim that sexual orientation is a particu-
lar social group.113  Olivia Nabulwala fled her country after suffering
from repeated sexual violence and abuse at the hands of her family
and clan because of her sexual orientation.114  Upon first review, the
immigration judge recognized sexual orientation as a particular social
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 645.
106. Id. at 648.
107. Karaouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 2005).
108. “Outing” is defined as the practice of revealing the sexual orientation of a person.
See Definition of Outing in English, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictiona-
ries.com/definition/english/outing (last visited Apr. 27, 2013).
109. Karaouni, 399 F.3d at 1173–75.
110. Named after Thomas Hobson in the fifteenth century, a “Hobson’s choice” is an
apparently free choice in which the chooser has only one real option.  In other
words, it is a forced choice. See Hobson’s Choice, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hobson%27s%20choice (last visited Apr.
27, 2013).
111. Karaouni, 399 F.3d at 1173.
112. Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 588, 567 (2003); Hernandez-Montiel v.
INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000)).
113. Nabulwala v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir. 2007).
114. Id. at 1116–17.
642 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:627
group but then used her particular social group to hold her to a higher
standard of past persecution.115  The court criticized the immigration
judge’s comparison of Olivia’s claim to another case demonstrating an
extreme example of persecution against a sexual minority, rather
than conducting an independent analysis of her claim based on the
totality of her particular circumstances.116  It also criticized the immi-
gration judge’s insufficient findings of fact and the BIA’s use of those
facts to mischaracterize Olivia’s situation.117
At no point in the aforementioned cases did the courts conduct an
independent analysis of the BIA’s social visibility test to award sexual
orientation a per se status under particular social group.  Although the
BIA listed “homosexuals” as a socially visible group when it created
the social visibility test in In re C-A-, this declaration does not substi-
tute for application of the law.118  Sexual orientation would arguably
fail the social visibility test if properly applied, as many sexual minori-
ties residing in intolerant countries hide their sexual orientation from
society to protect themselves, their partners, and their families.119
Furthermore, applying social visibility to sexual minorities would re-
sult in arbitrary and inconsistent decisions, as it would only provide
for the masculine women or effeminate men who are immediately per-
ceived as sexual minorities in society.120  Not all sexual minorities
conform to cognizable stereotypes; therefore, not all sexual minorities
are socially visible.
The BIA’s social visibility test forgets that a refugee’s well-founded
fear of persecution need not come from the world at large.  Nor must it
come from a governmental actor.121  Just because a person’s status is
not visible to society as a whole does not protect him or her from po-
tential persecution.  It is enough that a persecutor could cause harm
once the particular characteristic of the group is manifest.122  There-
115. The immigration judge held that the applicant did not establish past persecution
because her level of abuse did not meet the extreme level suffered by the gay
applicant in In re Toboso-Alfonso. Id. at 1117.
116. Id. at 1118.
117. Id.
118. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006).
119. “[T]he social stigma associated with homosexuality forces the majority of lesbians
and gay men to hide their sexual orientation. . . . Secrecy, silence and invisibility
are themselves contributing factors to the human rights violations suffered by les-
bians and gay men.”  Marouf, supra note 48, at 79 (quoting Bill Fairbairn, Gay
Rights Are Human Rights: Gay Asylum Seekers in Canada, in PASSING LINES 237,
243–44 (Brad Epps et al. eds., 2005)).
120. Marouf, supra note 48, at 84–87.
121. See, e.g., Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Persecution meted out
by groups that the government is unable or unwilling to control constitutes perse-
cution under the Act. . . .  Non-governmental groups need not file articles of incor-
poration before they can be capable of persecution.”); McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d
1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1981).
122. Marouf, supra note 48, at 83–84.
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fore, a claim for asylum should not rest on whether the applicant
dresses or acts a certain way, but rather on the merits of his or her
claim.
Additionally, the BIA has yet to recognize transgender identity as
a particular social group.  When compared to the great strides
achieved by other sexual minorities in asylum law, the courts’ reluc-
tance to expressly recognize transgender identity only mirrors the
negativity associated with transgender persons in American culture.
Instead, both the immigration courts and the courts of appeal have
creatively used sexual orientation to grant transgender applicants
asylum.123  Although transgender identity could arguably be the only
member of the sexual minorities to pass both the protected character-
istic and social visibility tests, the courts of appeal have avoided such
an analysis.124  Rather than recognize transgender identity as its own
politically correct social group, the courts have granted asylum based
on membership in the particularly awkward social group of “gay men
with female characteristics.”125  This uncomfortable rhetoric high-
lights the court’s refusal to understand or recognize the realities and
universality of personal identity outside the gender binary.
The Ninth Circuit is currently the only circuit to step closer to the
proper recognition of transgender persons in asylum claims in recog-
nizing “male-to-female transsexual[s]” as a particular social group.126
However, the term transsexual cannot substitute for the recognition of
the transgender community.  Gender identity and expression are very
personal forms of identity that vary with each individual.  Transsex-
ual is an older term used in the medical and psychological communi-
ties to refer to a person whose gender identity does not match his or
her anatomical gender.127  Many transsexual people seek to anatomi-
cally correct their gender through surgery.128  But it is a specific term
with which very few transgender people identify and, consequently, it
does not encompass the majority of the transgender community.129
For example, not every drag queen or cross-dresser identifies as
transsexual.  Transgender, on the other hand, is an umbrella term
that encompasses people “whose gender identity or gender expression
differs from the sex they were assigned at birth.”130  This includes, but
123. See, e.g., Morales v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007); Hernandez-Montiel v.
INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1085 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that “gay men with female
sexual identities” in Mexico may be a particular social group).
124. Asylum, supra note 94.
125. Id.
126. Morales, 478 F.3d at 975.
127. Definition of Terms, supra note 7.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Frequently Asked Questions, GLAD ALLIANCE, http://www.gladalliance.org/gender-
identity/transgender/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Apr. 27, 2013).
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is not limited to, transsexuals and cross-dressers.131  Because of its
all-encompassing nature, the term transgender is the only proper
term to use when dealing with questions of gender identity, noncon-
forming gender roles, and gender-variant behavior.132  If the courts
continue using the term “transsexual,” they will also continue to deny
the majority of the transgender community proper recognition under
the law, thereby allowing the perceived norms of the adjudicator to fill
any analytical gaps.
IV. IDENTIFYING SOURCES OF “MORALITY” IN SEXUALLY
CONTROVERSIAL ASYLUM CLAIMS
When taken together, the aforementioned cases indicate that the
presence of morality in asylum decisions creates inconsistencies and
injustices in the law.  Public morality’s subtle grip on asylum law does
not render it any less forceful, particularly when its influence affects
the most important player in the asylum process: the decision maker.
Two main concepts contribute to the unsettling effect of morality in
the asylum context: (1) the limited American understanding of non-
conforming sexual experiences and (2) the inconsistent interpretations
of “particular social group” in United States asylum law.
A. The American Understanding of Nonconforming Sexual
Experiences is Severely Limited
Society’s discomfort should not snatch away a victim’s potential for
refugee status, as that status may be his or her last form of protection.
Unfortunately, as demonstrated in the above cases, the American un-
derstanding of nonconforming sexual experiences is so limited that it
interferes with immigration adjudications, particularly in asylum
cases.  Moreover, this limited knowledge is so pervasive that judges
and agency decision makers are not immune to the influence of these
widespread moral judgments.  This lack of cultural objectivity improp-
erly inhibits the success of otherwise eligible asylum applicants, par-
ticularly when the nature of these cases is of a controversial sex-based
nature.
The blinders on the American understanding of nonconforming
sexual experiences in the context of forced prostitution and sex traf-
ficking are undeniable.  In the United States, women’s equality is
more than a movement—it is a policy.  The modern American culture
recognizes the autonomy of women in various life decisions, including
decisions involving her career, marriage, and reproductive choices.133
131. Id.
132. Gender-variant behavior refers to behavior that diverges from the normative gen-
der roles of society. Id.
133. McKinnon, supra note 60, at 14–15.
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Women in Western cultures are also portrayed as having sexual
power in the media and pop culture.134  These widespread perceptions
of women lead the American public to believe that prostitution is an
individual choice made by the woman herself.135  Yet, in many cases,
the public could not be more wrong.
The sharp line drawn between prostitution and sex trafficking is
nothing more than an illusion, painted by society to blanket reality.
Americans often stereotype prostitution in one of two ways: a girl
dragged at gunpoint from one job to another or a young, uneducated
woman seeking wealth, glamour, and self-confidence through pay-
ment for her sexual services.136  Reality’s true line is much more
blurred.  In her article Prostitution and Civil Rights, Catharine Mc-
Kinnon boldly describes the realities of prostitution by stating that
“[m]ost, if not all, prostitution is ringed with force in the most conven-
tional sense, from incest to kidnapping to forced drugging to assault to
criminal law.”137  She continues to describe the effects of the ignorant
American attitude toward prostitution by saying, “Prostitution as an
institution silences women by . . . terrorizing them . . . by punishing
them for telling the truth about their condition, [and] by degrading
whatever they do manage to say about virtually anything because of
who they are seen as being.”138
A common misunderstood phenomenon in prostitution and traf-
ficking is that of “survival sex.”  For many impoverished women and
children, sex becomes a legitimate, and sometimes the only, foresee-
able option to continue to survive and provide for a family.  Once in
the trade and without the basic knowledge necessary to defend them-
selves, these young women and children quickly become victims of
fear, abuse, and forced drug addiction.139  Although some cases of
prostitution present an individualized choice, many do not.  The wo-
men involved in prostitution rings suffer from inexplicable violence
and racism, but their torture remains socially invisible.
The actual effect of public morality in asylum claims is, perhaps,
most evident in LGBTQ asylum claims.  A brief history of sexual mi-
norities in the asylum process uniquely illustrates how popular norms
in American culture affect outcomes in adjudications.  When the
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. Melissa Farley, Prostitution, Trafficking, and Cultural Amnesia: What We Must
Not Know in Order to Keep the Business of Sexual Exploitation Running
Smoothly, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 109, 110 (2006).
137. McKinnon, supra note 60, at 25–26 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 15.
139. Dale Youngbee, Chicago: A Survivor of Gay Sex Trafficking Speaks Up About His
Ordeal, WASH. TIMES, June 18, 2012, http://communities.washingtontimes.com/
neighborhood/rights-so-divine/2012/jun/18/chicago-survivor-gay-sex-trafficking-
speaks-about-/.
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United States first adopted the Refugee Act of 1980, homosexuality
was not tolerated, in practice or in law.140  Sexual minorities faced
criminal charges for expressing same-sex affection.141  In 1986, the
Supreme Court upheld such sodomy statutes.142  It was not until 2003
that sodomy laws were ruled unconstitutional.143  The spotlight on
gay rights first gained momentum in 1993, when the Hawaii Supreme
Court struck down a ban on same-sex marriage.144  In the decade fol-
lowing that decision, the intimate lives of sexual minorities became a
hot topic of conversation, both in the media and at the American din-
ner table.
Throughout this timeline, case law shows a significant rise in the
grants of LGBTQ asylum claims through the consistent recognition of
gay men and lesbian women as members of particular social
groups.145  This increase in successful asylum applications for the gay
and lesbian community is corollary to the growing support of civil
rights and equality for the American gay community.  In 1996, only
27% of Americans supported same-sex marriage.146  As of 2013, an
unprecedented majority of the public (55%) now supports same-sex
marriage.147  However, the marriage debate faces political opposition,
and these lower numbers may not accurately reflect American atti-
tudes toward same-sex attraction in general.  In a separate study re-
leased in May of 2011, the Pew Research Center found that 58% of
Americans believe that “homosexuality should be accepted, rather
than discouraged, by society.”148
By contrast, the reluctance of adjudicators to properly recognize an
entire group’s gender identity149 can be linked to current American
sentiment toward transgendered individuals.  Although support for
the gay and lesbian community has grown to a majority over the past
decade, the understanding and support of the transgender community
140. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
141. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 55; Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.
142. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.
143. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
144. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (1993).
145. See, e.g., Nabulwala v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 2007); Karaouni v. Gon-
zales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 2005); Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719 (3d
Cir. 2003); Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990).
146. Caitlin Stark & Amy Roberts, By the Numbers: Same-Sex Marriage, CNN POL.
(June 26, 2013, 4:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/11/politics/btn-same-sex-
marriage.
147. Susan Page, Poll: Support for Gay Marriage Hits High After Ruling, USA TODAY
(July 1, 2013, 10:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/07/
01/poll-supreme-court-gay-marriage-affirmative-action-voting-rights/2479541/.
148. Most Say Homosexuality Should Be Accepted by Society, PEW RES. CENTER (May
13, 2011), http://www.people-press.org/2011/05/13/most-say-homosexuality-
should-be-accepted-by-society/.
149. Asylum, supra note 94.
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is minimal at best.150  The results of a preliminary survey of American
attitudes toward transgender people “indicate that negative attitudes
are widespread.”151  In a 2011 study, researchers found that trans-
gender persons had double the unemployment rate of the general pop-
ulation and nearly one-fifth of the transgender population had been
denied housing or medical care on the basis of gender identity or ex-
pression.152  Some researchers suggest that these attitudes may be a
result of a general discomfort with the deviation from the comfortable
gender binary; however, more research is needed to confirm this hy-
pothesis.153  Regardless of the early nature of the studies, the num-
bers show that transgendered persons face an overwhelmingly
negative public opinion and have yet to gain the acceptance attained
by other sexual minorities.154
B. Inconsistent Interpretations Lead to Unfettered
Discretion in Interpreting “Particular Social Group”
Normally, agency discretion should only be exercised after an ap-
plicant meets the refugee definition.155  But owing to the inconsistent
approaches to defining membership in a particular social group,
judges and other asylum adjudicators must decide which test to follow
and often find themselves with expanded discretion.  Furthermore, be-
cause the BIA’s own results of its social visibility analysis are so in-
consistent,156 courts are left to wade through unguided analysis when
determining social visibility.  Such power with so little guidance in-
vites the influences of morality and, consequently, an abuse of
discretion.
The courts’ unwavering adherence to the Chevron doctrine, com-
bined with the BIA’s inconsistent understanding of its own test, only
enables this abuse of discretion.  In 2006, the United States Supreme
Court firmly reprimanded the federal courts of appeal in Gonzales v.
Thomas by holding that the BIA’s interpretation of membership in a
particular social group is entitled to deference under the well-estab-
150. Aaron T. Norton & Gregory M. Herek, Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward Trans-
gender People: Findings from a National Probability Sample of U.S. Adults,
ACADEMIA (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.academia.edu/1220851/Heterosexuals_Atti
tudes_Toward_Transgender_People_Findings_from_a_National_Probability_
Sample_of_U.S._Adults.
151. Id. at 14.
152. JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY
TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 3–4
(2011), available at http://transequality.org/PDFs/Executive_Summary.pdf.
153. Norton & Herek, supra note 150.  Gender binary is a term used to describe the
normative expression of male and female gender and gender roles. Id.
154. Id.
155. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006).
156. See, e.g., Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009).
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lished Chevron doctrine.157  The Chevron doctrine arose out of a for-
mer Supreme Court case in which the Court clearly articulated the
doctrine of administrative deference and set forth a legal test for de-
termining whether to give an administrative agency deference in the
interpretation of its applicable statutes.158  The test requires a court
to review two issues: (1) whether Congress explicitly addressed the
issue and, if not, (2) whether the agency’s interpretation is a permissi-
ble construction of the statute.159  Mindful of the Supreme Court’s
“admonition,” most circuit courts have utilized the Chevron doctrine to
accept the BIA’s social visibility test without questioning the method
in which it is used or whether such a test overrides its former applica-
tions of the law under the protected characteristic test.160
This form of reflexive deference operated by the majority of the cir-
cuit courts is inappropriate in the asylum context.  In his opinion for
the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner most clearly articulates how the
BIA’s application of the law has been inconsistent at best and why this
inconsistency requires a rejection of the “social visibility” test:
[The BIA’s social visibility test] makes no sense; nor has the Board attempted,
in this or any other case, to explain the reasoning behind the criterion of social
visibility.  Women who have not yet undergone female genital mutilation in
tribes that practice it do not look different from anyone else.  A homosexual in
a homophobic society will pass as heterosexual . . . [And] those former employ-
ees of the Colombian attorney general [who were targeted for assassination]
tried hard, one can be sure, to become invisible and, so far as appears, were
unknown to Colombian society as a whole.161
Particularly, Judge Posner noted that under current interpretations of
the law, it would be impossible to “classify socially invisible groups as
particular social groups . . . without repudiating the other line of
157. Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006).
158. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
159. Id. at 842–43.
160. See, e.g., Fuentes-Hernandez v. Holder, 411 F. App’x 438, 438–39 (2d Cir. 2011)
(stating Salvadoran individuals who resist gang recruitment are not part of a
particular social group because they are not socially visible); Valdiviezo-
Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting BIA’s social visibil-
ity doctrine); Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011); Lizama v.
Holder, 629 F.3d 400 (4th Cir. 2011) (calling social visibility doctrine into doubt);
Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011); Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d
662, 666–67 (9th Cir. 2010); Guevara-Acosta v. Att’y Gen., 372 F. App’x 52, 53–54
(11th Cir. 2010); Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 365–67 (6th Cir. 2010)
(concluding that being a former gang member is part of a particular social group
because it is an immutable characteristic and socially visible to his persecutors);
Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 885, 862 (9th Cir. 2009); Gatimi, 578 F.3d at
615–16 (rejecting BIA’s social visibility doctrine as inconsistent and arbitrary);
Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2009) (rejecting claims that BIA is
precluded from considering social visibility); Malonga v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 546,
554 (8th Cir. 2008).
161. Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615–16.
2014] REFUGEE ROULETTE 649
cases.”162  Inconsistency in application should raise the flag for courts
to reject the BIA’s social visibility test under the Chevron doctrine.
Picking and choosing one of multiple inconsistent interpretations
will only “condone arbitrariness and usurp the agency’s
responsibilities.”163
Furthermore, the rejection of the social visibility doctrine is also
consistent with the international guidelines issued by the United Na-
tions High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) in 2002.164  The
UNHCR recognized the predominant use of the protected characteris-
tic and social perception approaches in various countries and sought
to reconcile the various approaches with the proposal of a single defi-
nition of particular social group:
[A] particular social group is a group of persons who share a common charac-
teristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a
group by society.  The characteristic will often be one which is innate, un-
changeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the
exercise of one’s human rights . . . [Only if] a claimant alleges a social group
that is based on a characteristic determined to be neither unalterable or fun-
damental [should] further analysis . . . be undertaken to determine whether
the group is nonetheless perceived as a cognizable group in that society.165
The UNHCR guidelines make it clear that social visibility and public
perception is a secondary form of analysis reserved only for when a
protected immutable characteristic is disputed or nonexistent.  It
should not be a dual requirement or a factor in every analysis of “par-
ticular social group.”
To conform to the current interpretations of the law inevitably
leads to arbitrary and inconsistent results, influenced by the majority
views of morality and harming well-deserving and otherwise eligible
asylum seekers.  As legal scholar Richard A. Wasserstrom once noted:
“[T]he judge usually begins with the conclusion that he deems proper
and only later seeks to rationalize this result by purporting to show
that it derives necessarily from the ‘relevant’ legal rule. . . . [R]ules of
law are nothing more than expressions of the judge’s desire.”166  With-
out concrete context and guidelines in the law, the decision maker’s
morals will also influence his or her thinking.  But judges are not
meant to rule according to popular societal norms.  They are meant to
be an objective voice in the judicial system and weigh all things
162. Id. at 616.
163. Id.
164. Marouf, supra note 48, at 60.
165. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], Guidelines on International Protec-
tion: “Membership of a Particular Social Group” within the context of Article
1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter UNHCR
Guidelines].
166. RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION 21 (1961).
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equally, in adherence with the law.  The inconsistencies created by the
BIA cannot continue to expand judicial discretion and the influence of
morality.  To curb the effect of morality in the decision-making pro-
cess, judges and agency decision makers require clear, concise, and
consistent guidelines, both in statutory and case law, to eliminate the
problem of unwarranted judicial discretion.
V. FULFILLING INTERNATIONAL AND HUMANITARIAN
OBLIGATIONS THROUGH REDRAFTING AND
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
The situations of refugees alter with the developments of the
world, and courts cannot continue to deny protection to victims of hate
crimes, torture, trafficking, and other horrifying forms of persecution
merely because the statutory language fails to account for the greatest
harms facing humanity today.  But introducing gender as a protected
ground to qualify for refugee status would greatly reduce the influence
of morality in the asylum courtroom.  Likewise, adopting the
UNHCR’s guidelines on membership in a particular social group
would help minimize the ambiguity surrounding its interpretation,
thereby reducing the overexpansion of judicial discretion in sex-based
claims.  Although reducing morality’s effect is a large task, redrafting
both the domestic and international law is a necessary first step in
eliminating statutory ambiguity, unfettered agency discretion, and ul-
timately, the morality bias.
Currently, the absence of gender as a protected ground for refugee
status fails to adequately align the law with the purposes of the 1951
Convention and its subsequent 1967 Protocol.  When a trafficked wo-
man cannot rely on her gender to provide her protection, she is left
with few, if any, options for an asylum claim.  Her only recourse lies
within a claim for membership in a particular social group, but even
that will be denied due to the circular nature of the identifying group
and its form of persecution.167  Furthermore, a transgender individual
must creatively characterize his or her claim by refusing to recognize
the true basis for his or her persecution based on a gender noncon-
forming identity.  Gender-based claims are often swept into member-
ship in a particular social group, where current interpretations of the
phrase fail to account for gender-related harms.
For example, although the UNHCR has recognized that trafficking
victims may be refugees when they “face serious repercussions after
their escape and/or upon their return, such as reprisals or retaliation
from trafficking rings or individuals, real possibilities of being re-traf-
ficked, severe community or family ostracism, or severe discrimina-
tion,” this guiding language focuses more on the analysis of
167. Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 555–56 (6th Cir. 2005).
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persecution than the recognition of trafficking victims as a particular
social group.168  As a result, a court may accept or deny its interpreta-
tion of a trafficking victim’s particular social group based on its char-
acterization of her facts.  Unfortunately, this allows a court to allow
public morality to influence its view of her situation.  In other words,
depending on the facts of her claim, the court may see her case as one
involving nothing more than a “despicable” husband with bad inten-
tions or one involving “children who have been abandoned by their
parents and who have no received surrogate form of protection.”169
Both interpretations completely exclude the very serious issue of sex
trafficking, and this refusal to recognize the issue fails to meet the
international obligations established by the 1951 Convention and its
subsequent Protocol.
A. Domestic Redrafting
The unfair outcomes for sexually controversial asylum seekers are
unacceptable, and both international and humanitarian obligations
demand change.  Congress should provide better guidance in the stat-
utory language to eliminate the majority views of morality in the asy-
lum courtroom.  In order to accomplish this change, I propose two
changes to the definition of refugee under INA § 101(a)(42): (1) the
addition of sex/gender as a protected ground and (2) the inclusion of
specific factors in the interpretation of particular social group through
the adoption of the UNHCR’s aforementioned definition.
Opponents of immigration reform have argued that changing the
current definitions of refugee law will only open the floodgates to the
admission of nearly any person into the United States.170  However,
this fear is misplaced.  Qualifying for a protected ground does not si-
multaneously qualify an individual for asylum.  Asylum seekers must
prove all elements of the refugee definition, including persecution, a
nexus between that persecution and the protected ground, and the ex-
istence of an uncooperative or inept government in the home country.
Furthermore, there are certain bars to asylum, including the material
support bar and certain gang-related bars based on criminal activity,
that operate as safeguards for the state’s interest in maintaining con-
trol over its population.171
By incorporating gender as a protected ground for refugee status,
the law will be one step closer to properly addressing the needs of
168. Pomeroy, supra note 87, at 482.
169. See id.; Knight, supra note 88, at 14.
170. Kristin A. Bresnahan, The Board of Immigration Appeals’ New “Social Visibility”
Test for Determining “Membership of a Particular Social Group” in Asylum
Claims and Its Legal and Policy Implications, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 649, 675
(2011).
171. Id. at 676.
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many sexually controversial asylum applicants and eliminating the
influence of morality in the courtroom.  As mentioned in Part III, sex
trafficking is often a gender-specific crime.  Because of this, women
struggle to form a legally sufficient description of their particular so-
cial group.  By adding gender as a protected ground, women will no
longer have claims dismissed on criticisms of rhetoric.  Rather, women
will qualify for a protected ground in the context of their experiences
and must demonstrate their refugee status through the severity of
their circumstances under an analysis of persecution.
Gender will provide additional protections for sexual minorities
seeking asylum.  Recognizing gender would recognize the difficulties
facing gender nonconforming individuals and not preempt their cases
by a mischaracterization of gender identity as an awkward phrasing
of sexual orientation under particular social group.  Furthermore, by
understanding sexual orientation as a limit on whom an individual
may romantically associate with based on his or her gender, sexual
orientation may also be covered by gender as a protected ground.
Sexual minorities traditionally fall into this foggy realm of particu-
lar social group.  Although the disputed understanding of particular
social group begs for reform outside of the context of sexually contro-
versial asylum seekers, its inconsistent results in the aforementioned
cases exemplify why reform is necessary.  By adopting the UNHCR’s
definition of particular social group into the INA’s statutory frame-
work, Congress would effectively eliminate the inconsistent interpre-
tations and tests circling the various circuits and courts.  The
UNHCR’s definition provides the necessary guidance to interpreting
the phrase, as well as covering both actual and imputed characteris-
tics.  Moreover, the existence of a secondary test, should the proposed
group fail the first test, will not open the floodgates to asylum applica-
tions.  It is sufficiently narrow to safeguard the state’s interest in pro-
tecting its borders from arbitrary overpopulation, while
simultaneously providing adequate coverage of internationally perse-
cuted groups in need of asylum.
B. International Redrafting
As a major influence in the international community, the United
States’ obligation to provide for the needs of refugees should not stop
at its own borders.  Rather, the United States should endorse and en-
courage refugee reform on the international level through an amend-
ment to Article 1 of the 1951 Convention.  Over forty-five years after
the adoption of the 1967 Protocol, the international community has
again begun to demand for the restructuring of the international defi-
nition of refugee, as well as state obligations.  The passage of time
brings about new schemes of natural disasters, political conflict, and
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targeted oppression that a strict reading of that language simply does
not cover.  It is time for change.
The current definition, which has been adopted by hundreds of
state actors, fails to include various types of refugees, including inter-
nally displaced persons, environmental refugees, and stateless per-
sons.  Because of the model language’s lack of coverage, various
persons in need of international assistance may not qualify for asylum
in any country outside of their own.  Admittedly, providing adequate
coverage without opening the floodgates is a tricky task.  However, the
case of sexually controversial applicants clearly demands, at the very
least, the recognition of gender and sex as an international refugee
instrument.  Such a change would be consistent with many of the in-
ternational community’s purposes and goals in promoting the equality
of women and sexual minorities.172  In order to provide the most pro-
tection to those in need, the United States should propose the follow-
ing amendment to Article 1 of the 1951 Convention:
Article 1
DEFINITION OF THE TERM “REFUGEE”
A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “refugee” shall apply
to any person who . . . (2) . . . [O]wing to a well-founded fear of being perse-
cuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, sex, membership in a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country . . .
This new definition of refugee would then be incorporated into the
1967 Protocol, mandating state compliance with the 1951 Conven-
tion’s provisions.173  In proposing and supporting an amendment to an
international document, the United States should mirror much of the
language used in other significant international instruments, such as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)174 or the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).175  Both the
UDHR and the ICCPR contain provisions safeguarding all rights
“without distinction of any kind, such as . . . sex . . . .”176  While “sex”
has commonly been interpreted to mean gender, the United Nations
Human Rights Commission officially included sexual orientation in
172. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, at
193 (Dec. 18, 1979); Security Council Resolutions, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml (last vis-
ited Nov. 26, 2012); U.N. Backs Gay Rights for First Time Ever, CBS NEWS (June
17, 2011, 2:28 PM) http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-20072040.html.
173. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 17, ¶¶ 32–34.
174. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., Supp. No. 13, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
175. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
176. Id. art. II, ¶ 1.
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the ICCPR’s definition of “sex.”177  In the subsequent years, this ex-
panded interpretation of sex in international law has been extended to
other legally binding international instruments, such as the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men (CEDAW), the Convention Against Torture (CAT), the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the International Conven-
tion on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).178  The
use of the word “sex” rather than “gender” would ensure more compre-
hensive coverage of the various sexually controversial claims in inter-
national law, including those surrounding sexual orientation, gender
identity, and forced prostitution, and would provide more statutory
protection against the influence of morality in the fates of well-deserv-
ing refugees.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current scheme of asylum law does not lead to desirable out-
comes, and the reality of its legal inadequacies demands change.  The
BIA’s construction of particular social group under the social visibility
test allows the objective decision maker to be easily influenced by the
popular view of the majority and inevitably results in the improper
exclusion of previously recognized particular social groups and other
inconsistencies.  This absence of cultural objectivity within the courts
should not arbitrarily rob well-deserving individuals of the opportu-
nity to rebuild their lives.  To manifest the change necessary to guar-
antee access to fair asylum procedures for all applicants, the United
States must aim to eliminate the statutory ambiguity surrounding the
particular social group analysis.  By simply incorporating gender as a
protected ground and redefining particular social group consistent
with international asylum guidelines, the United States can take
enormous strides in eliminating the expansion of judicial discretion
and its resulting inequities in controversial sex-based asylum claims.
This additional statutory guidance, both domestically and internation-
ally, will work to assure that popular opinions will no longer be the
voice of the courts in refugee and asylum law—the law will.
177. In Toonen v. Australia, a Tasmanian gay activist filed an individual complaint
directly with the Human Rights Commission, alleging that Australian laws
criminalizing consensual and private sex between adult males violated his right
to privacy under Article 17 of the ICCPR. Toonen v. Australia, U.N. GAOR
Human Rights Comm’n, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 40, vol. 2, U.N. Doc. A/49/40, at
226 (1994) (holding that a statute criminalizing homosexual conduct violated the
ICCPR).
178. Holning Lau, Sexual Orientation: Testing the Universality of International
Human Rights Law, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1689, 1701–02 (2004).
